In this course we propose to question a hypothesis that, at least until the 20th century, was widely accepted: that thinking is, as Kant stated (KrV, A69 B94), “knowing through concepts”. We maintain that there is a thought through images, which is equivalent to saying that there is a type of understanding and relationship with reality that is established in the material deployment of images. This problem presents us with the challenge of considering the specificity that images provide.

The conflict arising from images is not that of making abstract knowledge concrete. The cognitive, affective and sensible function of images does not operate in the manner of propositional language, in which events can be causally connected with initial premises, but rather develops its relationships through another logic. It is therefore necessary not only to resemanticize the images but also to try out other categories for describing the logic of images, such as scene, rhythm, gesture and staging.

The scene is not an allegory that is constructed to illustrate an idea; from the outset and on principle, the scene is an encounter. This understanding allows us to avoid thinking of images as fixed entities or units and to conceive them as shifts of scenes: it redefines their status. When you show something, it becomes necessary to show many things, because what makes an image is not an element or an index that designates the whole gathered in it. What makes an image is the movement that links, the vibration in which something different emerges: that which is moving.